This work is inspired by a 2013 paper from Arne Traulsen's lab at the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Biology [10]. They studied the small mutation limit of evolutionary games. It has been shown that for 2×2 games the ranking of the strategies does not change as strength of selection is increased [11]. The point of the 2013 paper is that when there are three or more strategies the ordering can change as selection is increased. Traulsen et al [10] did numerical computations for fixed N . Here, we will instead let the strength of selection β = c/N and let N → ∞ to obtain formulas for the invadability probabilities φ ij that determine the rankings. The integrals that give these probabilities are difficult to evaluate in general, but they do allow us to compute the ranking order when c is small or c is large. The results we have obtained for five concrete examples lead us to doubt the accuracy of insights that are derived in the small mutation limit for ames with gthree strategies.
Introduction
Let a ij be the payoff to a player who uses strategy i against an opponent who uses strategy j. Let x j be the frequency of strategy j and define the fitness of strategy i to be
the payoff when a player with strategy i plays against a randomly chosen individual. We will study how the frequencies behave under imitation dynamics. In this evolution a player a chosen at random from the population compares her payoff to an opponent b chosen at random and changes her opinion with probability g(β(ψ i(b) − ψ i(a) )) where β indicates the strength of selection and g : R → (0, 1) is a nondecreasing function, such as the Fermi function g(x) = 1/(1+e −x ). Thinking of biological competition and following in the footsteps of [4] , Traulsen et al [10] consider the situation is small enough so that at most times there is only one strategy i in the population. In this case a mutation that introduces one j into a population that is all i will go to fixation with probability φ ij that can be computed by analyzing a birth and death chain. Having computed φ ij one can then analyze the Markov chain with jumps from i to j at rate µφ ij to find the equilibrium frequencies π i (β) of the strategies.
The relative sizes of the π i (β) gives an ordering of the strategies. It has been shown that for 2 × 2 games the ranking of the strategies does not change as strength of fitness is increased [11] . The point of [10] is that when there are three or more strategies the ordering can change as β is increased, which the authors tout as a weakness of the "weak selection" viewpoint. In the supplementary materials of [10] they give a complicated argument for the existence of a game in which the strategy ordering can change. In the body of the paper they report on simulations of games with randomly chosen entries that show ranking changes occur in approximately 45% of games.
Here, we will let the strength of selection β = c/N and let N → ∞ to obtain formulas for the invadability probabilities φ ij that determine the rankings. The integrals that give these probabilities, see (6) , are difficult to evaluate in general, but they do allow us to compute the ranking order when c is small or c is large. The dichotomy between small c and large c is similar to that of wN and N w limits introduced by Jeoeng et al [5] and recently studied by Sample and Allen [8] . In the first case one lets the strength of selection w → 0 the number of individuals N → ∞. In the second the order of the limits is reversed. In our case w = c?N so w → 0 and N → ∞ simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we develop formulas for the φ ij . In Section 3 we compute the stationary distribution for the Markov chain that gives the transition between dominant strategies. In Sections 4 and 5 we give our results for small c and large c respectively. Section 6 prepares for the study of examples by developing formulas for the three different classes of 2×2 games. In Sections 7 -11 we apply our results we have obtained to five concrete examples. As explained in the discussion in Section 12 the results obtained from the small mutation limit lead us to doubt the accuracy of insights that are derived in the small mutation limit. In a nutshell, the method is problematic because it looks only at the 2 × 2 subgames, and not at whether the third strategy can invade (increase when small), which is the key to the analysis of spatial games in [2] and [7] .
Formulas for φ ij sec:phi
In what follows we will use a theorem-proof style of exposition to highlight the main results and to allow the reader to skip the details of the derivations For simplicity, we will ignore the fact that you can't play the game against yourself to write the payoffs from playing strategies i and j when k individuals are using strategy j as
Here, i is the wild type, j is the mutant. The payoff difference
k N Note that if we add c k to the entries in the kth column, the payoff difference is not changed so we can without loss of generality suppose that the diagonal entries are 0. If we do this then the payoff difference is
We assume that each individual updates his strategy at rate 1, so the jump rates
Our first step is to compute the fixation probability. The next result is the same as (4) in the supplementary materials of [10] . In hte context of evoluitonary games this formula was derived by Taylor et al [9] . However it was first discovered by Karlin and McGregor in the late 1950s [6] .
Proof. The first step is to define a function that has h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1, and
The last equation implies that if we let X t be the number of the invading type at time t, then E x h(X t ) remains constant so
To find h we note that (3) implies
Iterating and using h(1) − h(0) = 1 it follows that
and hence
hformula so using (4) gives (2).
Theorem 2. If we let γ = g (0)/g(0) and suppose N β → c then φ ij ≈ 1/N I ij where
Note that the answer only depends on 2γc so we can without loss of generality suppose γ = 1/2.
Here and in what follows we will write our results as approximations rather than asymptotic formulas so hhtat we do not have to estimate the size of errors
Proof. To begin to understand (2) we look at the ratio
Note that γ is the only aspect of g relevant to the value of φ ij . For the Fermi function
Taking log and using log(1 − x) ≈ −x we have
so we have
and it follows that if βN → c
which proves the desired result.
Equilibrium distribution sec:eq
If µ is the mutation rate from i to j = i the transition rate matrix is
To find the stationary distribution, we need to solve
The solution is straightforward, but somewhat tedious, so we just give the answer:
where D is the sum of the three numerators. The three formulas can be collapsed into one by writing
where j = i − 1 and k = i + 1 and the arithmetic is done in Z mod 3 = {1, 2, 3}.
Small c sec:smallc
The main result of this section is (11) which allows us to compute the strategy ranking for small c. The reader who gets bored with the details can skip to that point. If c is small
so using (6)
If we (i) cancel the 1/N 's and then drop terms of order c 2 then the numerators n i of the π i are
Note that in are missing appear twice n 1 1,2 and 1,3 3,1 and 2,1 n 2 2,1 and 2,3 3,2 and 1,2 n 3 3,2 and 3,1 1,3 and 2,3
If we let Γ = 3 + c[ψ 12 + ψ 13 + ψ 21 + ψ 23 + ψ 31 + ψ 32 ] then
To check the arithmetic, note that the terms that are missing must be positive inside the square brackets while those that appear twice must be negative.
The relative sizes of the n i gives the strategy ordering for small c. To further simplify we note that ψ ij − ψ ji = (a ji − a ij )/2. so if we let
and note that d ji = −d ij then we have
We have used d 31 instead of d 13 so we have the general formula
where the arithmetic is done modulo 3. It is not easy to write a formula for the ranking in terms of the entries of the game matrix. However, as the reader will see when we consider examples, it is easy to compute the rankings for a given example.
Large c sec:largec
The main result of the section is given in the table at the end. The reader who gets bored by the calculus can skip to that point. We are interested in estimating the size of
when c is large. This will be determined by the largest value of the integrand on [0, 1]. To simplify notation we let α = −a ji , let β = a ji + a ij , and Artie
We begin with the case β = 0. If α < 0
If α > 0 we change variables x = 1 − y
Suppose now β = 0. Taking the derivative h (x) = α + βx so h (x) = 0 at x * = −α/β. There are several cases for the location of the maximum of the integrand
If the maximum occurs at 0 then h (0) = α < 0 and
If the maximum occurs at 1 then we change variables x = 1 − y to get
Note that if the maximum occurs at 1 then α + β > 0. If
If β > 0 then we are only in this case when x * = −α/β ≤ 1/2 so α + β/2 ≥ 0. If the maximum occurs at x * = −α/β ∈ (0, 1) then from the table we see that β < 0 and 0 < α < −β. We change variables
The second and fifth terms combine to produce the one out front. The first and fourth cancel.
Recalling that normal(0,σ 2 ) density is (2πσ 2 ) −1/2 exp(−y 2 /2σ 2 ) and taking σ 2 = 1/(−cβ) we see that
Combining the table that gives the location of the maxima with the last five calculations.
6 Three types of edges sec:threee
To prepare for using the large c formulas on examples, we note that I ij and I ji only depend on the 2 × 2 subgame with strategies i and j. In this game only three things can happen i j, there is a stable mixed strategy equilibrium, or there is an unstable mixed strategy equilibrium Case 1. i dominates j. Since we have 0's on the diagonal a ij > 0 and a ij < 0. We can have β = a ij + a ji positive or negative. case condition 
Thus in either case I ij = exp(c(α + β/2))/c(α + β) and I ji = 1/(−cα).
Case 2. Stable mixed strategy equilibrium. a ij > 0 and a ji > 0. Suppose without loss of generality that ρ i = a ij /(a ij + a ji ) < 1/2
Note that when i has ρ i < 1/2, I ji is large. 
Noting that n 3 > n 2 > n 1 , we see that for small c, 3 > 2 > 1.
Large c. To use the formulas derived in Sections 5 and 6 we compute α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. so for large c we have 2 > 3 > 1, a change from the small c ranking of 3 > 2 > 1.
Generalizing from the concrete example we see that if 1 2 3 1 then all the d i,i+1 are negative. If d 31 is the smallest then The game matrix is 1 2 3 1 0 2 −1 2 4 0 3 3 2 −2 0 The 1,2 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (1/3, 2/3) in which each strategy has fitness 4/3. When played against this equilibrium 3 has fitness 2/3 − 4/3 = −2/3 so it cannot invade. In the other 2 × 2 subgames 3 1 and 2 3. 
Noting that n 2 > n 3 > n 1 , we see that for small c, 2 > 3 > 1.
Large c. Again we need to compute α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. From this we see that Dπ 2 ≈ 3c · 4c + 0 + 2c · 3c = 18c 2 while π 1 and π 3 are exponentially small. To compare π 1 and π 3 we need to compute the exact order of the three terms. The game matrix is 1 2 3 1 0 1 −1 2 2 0 3 3 2 1 0 The 1,2 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (1/3, 2/3) in which each strategy has fitness 2/3. When played against this equilibrium, strategy 3 has fitness 2/3 + 2/3 = 4/3 so it can invade. The 2,3 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (3/4, 1/4) in which each strategy has fitness 3/4. When played against this equilibrium, strategy 1 has fitness 3/4 − 1/4 = 1/2 so 1 cannot invade. In the 1,3 subgame 3 1
Small c. Using (10) and (11)
and it follows from (11) that
Large c. Again, α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. Using (6), φ ij = 1/N I ij we see that again φ 21 , φ 31 and φ 23 are exponentially small, so marking the small terms with *'s, we have the same pattern as in the previous example.
From this we see that
while π 1 and π 3 are exponentially small. To compare π 1 and π 3 we need to compute the exact order of the three terms. The game matrix is 1 2 3 1 0 2 −1 2 4 0 −3 3 2 −1 0 The 1,2 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (1/3, 2/3) in which each strategy has fitness 4/3. When played against this equilibrium 3 has fitness 2/3 − 2/3 = 0 so it cannot invade. The 2,3 subgame has an unstable mixed strategy equilibrium (3/4, 1/4) which can be invaded by 1. In the 1,3 subgame 3 1.
and it follows that n 1 = Γ − 5c/2 n 2 = Γ n 3 = Γ + 5c/2
Large c. Again, α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. We have an instance of case III here. In this case I ij = exp(−α 2 c/(2β))/Ac 1/2 ) where A = (−β/2π) This time all three terms are exponentially small. The exponential orders of the terms are This the ranking remains the same for large c: 3 > 2 > 1.
Example 5. Two ranking changes
sec:ex5
In the previous four examples there has been a most one ranking change. We now give an example with two changes. The game matrix is and it follows that
Noting that n 2 > n 1 > n 3 , we see that for small c, 2 > 1 > 3.
Large c. Again, α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. Using (9), φ ij = 1/N I ij we see that φ 21 , φ 31 , and φ 32 are exponentially small, so marking the small terms with *'s, we have the same pattern as in the previous example. so for large c we have 3 > 2 > 1. Comparing this with the small c ranking of 2 > 1 > 3 we can see that there must be two ranking changes to bring strategy 3 from last to first.
Discussion

sec:disc
In this paper we have developed methods for computing strategy rankings when mutation rates are small, the strength of selection is c/N , and the population size N → ∞. For any c the rankings can be computed by numerically evaluating an integral. We have simple explicit results when c is small or c is large. We have treated five examples to illustrate the method, but the conclusions in those examples have led us to question the accuracy of rankings obtained by considering extremely small mutation rates.
In Example 2, the mixed strategy of the 1,2 subgame is attracting, while 3 1 and 2
3. This situation can be drawn as: The calculation for Example 2 shows that it is very unlikely for 1 to invade and replace 2. However it is not difficult for 1 to invade and bring the system to the mixed strategy equilibrium for the 1,2 subgame in which there are M = N/3 individuals playing strategy 1.
To show this we use 12 to denote the equilibrium and combine (5) and (7) The derivative of −(2x − 3x 2 ) is −2 + 6x which is 0 at x = 1/3, < 0 for x < 1/3 and > 0 when x > 1/3, so if c is large and using (6) we have φ 2,12 ≈ 2c/N If the mutation rate per individual is ν/N then mutations will occur at rate ν in the population and the time until a successful mutation takes us to 12 has mean νN/(2c). By computing the Green's function of the birth and death chain (results not shown) one can show that the process will stay near the mixed strategy equilibrium for time O(NIn summary, the answers obtained for the small mutation limit are based on a consideration of the three 2 × 2 subgames. They do not consider the possibility of three strategy coexistence that can occur when the per individual mutation rate µ = O(1/N ). Our calculations show that the small mutation limit in some cases requires µ = o(N −2 ), which may not be reasonable for some applications.
When this paper was completed when did not realize that it was "well-known" that stable mixed strategy equilibria were problematic for the small mutation limit. Antal and Scheuring [1] discussed this for 2 × 2 games. Wu, Gokhale, Wang, and Traulsen [12] went further and quantified how small mutation rates should be. While for a coexistence game, where the best reply to any strategy is the opposite strategy, it is necessary that the mutation rate is less than N −1/2 exp(−N ) to ensure that the approximation is good, for all other games, it is sufficient if themutation rate is smaller than (N ln N ) −1 . Their results assume the strength of selection is fixed while N → ∞. In our weak selection limit o(N −2 is sufficent for all casses.
